

## **The new governance of Australian police services**

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### *Abstract:*

*Over the past twenty years, Australian police services have experienced unprecedented change and reform. The advent of managerialism in the public sector considerably eroded the independence of police commissioners and their organisations. The elaboration of national performance indicators and new forms of budget allocation processes have for example been central in transferring the decision-making power from police executives to politicians, through the Treasury. These changes have a direct effect upon police functions, at the policy and operational levels, some for the better and some for the worse. They redefine how Australian citizens and populations are policed but remain under-examined and unquestioned, although they represent one of the most powerful tools of modern government. Therefore, this article offers an overview of the recent organisational changes undergone by Australian police services. Beyond the official discourse, it seeks to analyse the underlying political rationale requiring these adjustments. The 'law and order' politics that routinely plague national and state elections, combined with a contraction of the welfare state and a loss of economic sovereignty due to the globalisation of exchanges will be identified as some of the main factors for these changes.*

Over the past twenty years, police services all over Australia have been exposed to the scrutiny of royal commissions, which have uncovered a disturbing pattern of corruption and inefficiency in their ranks. Simultaneously, the public has been introduced to the most unpalatable aspects of the police culture through a number of television documentaries and a flow of newspaper articles. At the same time, many liberal societies have been confronted to a paradigm shift: the welfare state became discredited as the preferred form of government and has been replaced by a more restrained model of government. It has given birth a new form of governance – a term which can be defined as ‘the process of co-directing in a network of many separate actors with different and opposing interests and more or less independent positions’<sup>1</sup> – which relies on the adoption by the public service of managerialist reforms. They are characterised by a belief in the superiority of the market over the state, the introduction of competition between government departments and agencies, a simultaneous process of centralisation and decentralisation, and the fragmentation of public services providers.<sup>2</sup> Because of public preoccupations with issues such as corruption and a tainted organisational culture, the implications on police functions and the governance of law enforcement of managerial reforms implemented by police services have largely been neglected. We will argue that far from being trivial, these changes have far reaching repercussions. They do no less than redefine how Australian communities are being policed, discarding the pretense of a legal obligation to enforce the law and maintain the peace for a more pragmatic façade, which consists of managing the risks posed by the ‘dangerous classes’. This trend is reinforced by the politics of law and order that are being played in Australia by all parties during election campaigns. Before we can show how the new discourse of police managerialism has lead to substantial reforms in the fields of budget allocation, performance evaluation and contractualisation, it is essential to contextualise these changes at the international and national levels and to highlight their political and social significance.

## ***International and national public sector reforms***

The reform of Australian police services since the early 1980s is only part of a broader phenomenon, which engulfed the majority of public services in the western world. The dominance of the neo-liberal ideology triggered a movement of public sector reform focused on cost-cutting and downsizing. The underlying postulate was that administrative interventions in the social and economic environment were inefficient and needed to be curtailed. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States or Great Britain, the notion of public administration was replaced by the concept of public management, and private sector recipes were deemed to be the solution to this crisis of confidence. This transformation in the perceived role of the state resulted from the convergence of economic, political and ideological factors.

The energy crisis of the 1970s and the incapacity of public administrations to shelter the population from its destructive social consequences clearly showed the limits of the Keynesian welfare state. High inflation and unemployment rates led to the election of conservative politicians such as Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in Great-Britain, considered the starting points of a wave of market deregulation that accompanied the demise of the welfare state. Think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Cato Institute in Washington, the Adam Smith Institute in London or the Center for Independent Studies in Australia were instrumental in wording this new policy of minimalist interventionism, under the intellectual patronage of political economist Friedrich von Hayek.<sup>3</sup> If it is true that reforms were badly needed and they had been initiated in certain cases by

Labor and Democrat governments, no one had expected the managerial revolution that ensued. The new public managers were granted a degree of freedom never experienced in order to deliver services in the most efficient way. Their performance was constructed in terms of outputs and outcomes, and customer satisfaction replaced the public interest as the central tenet of their actions. Traditional bureaucratic and pyramidal structures were broken down in semi-autonomous entities (budget centers) with a devolution of power. Non-core activities were contracted out to private businesses and in certain cases, government agencies had to compete against each other for the provision of services.<sup>4</sup> Australia found itself at the front line of this global trend.

Economic deregulation by the Hawke government in the early 1980s was the catalyst to public sector reform in Australia. The active resistance experienced from the public service a decade earlier by the Whitlam government in its attempt to reshape public policies after twenty-three years of Liberal rule convinced the newly elected Prime Minister to introduce new control mechanisms. Administrations and government agencies were submitted to new accountability procedures, through stringent program evaluation procedures and performance indicators. Budgets were cut significantly and numerous public servants made redundant.<sup>5</sup> By the 1990s, with the return in power of Liberal government at the federal and state levels, the public service was ready to face its biggest challenge. Contractualism became the new mantra of the reformers, with private enterprises being allocated responsibility for the provision of supplies, non-core services or even taking over entire areas of government service delivery. In 1996 for example, eighty seven percent of social and health spending and ninety percent of social housing spending had been subcontracted to the private sector.<sup>6</sup> By 1998, 85 000 more jobs had been shed in the public service.<sup>7</sup> These new bureaucratic arrangements had very concrete ramifications for citizens, who became engaged in a consumerist relation with the

state. In the contractual state, the legal-rational hierarchical system has been replaced by practices grounded in efficiency and effectiveness, while principles of democracy and equity disappear behind the almighty market. This new globalised approach to ministerial control would not have been possible without changes in the appointment of senior public servants, who gained in independence at the operational level in order to improve the responsiveness of their agencies, providing they relinquished their life tenured positions for shorter term contracts.<sup>8</sup>

Although they are responsible for one of the most central activities of government, namely to enforce laws and maintain the peace, Australian police services did not escape this managerial wave. Traditionally, police-government relations in Australia have followed the English model of the constable's independence, derived from landmark decisions such as *Enever v The King* 1906 and *Reg. V Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex Parte Blackburn* 1968. These decisions are interpreted as granting individual constables, but also their commanding officers, a large degree of independence from the political authority by which they are maintained, so that they can carry out their duties in a non-partisan and fair manner.<sup>9</sup> The legal theory of the independence of the constable was tested at the highest levels in South Australia and in Queensland in the 1970s, when police commissioners refused to obey directions given by their governments on operational matters. The ensuing royal commissions concluded that although commissioners were accountable to the government at the policy level, they retained certain discretionary powers in the management of their daily operations.<sup>10</sup> It is our contention that the managerial reforms that have affected Australian police services since the 1980s have significantly altered the operational independence of commissioners and strengthened the grip of ministerial controls on law enforcement.<sup>11</sup> In the following sections, we will successively examine how the discourse of the police hierarchy was impregnated by

managerial reform buzz-words and paved the way for new budget allocation processes, contractualism, and a renewed emphasis on performance evaluation. We will demonstrate how these changes have had consequences extending far beyond the simple improvement of efficiency and effectiveness in policing, creating what certain have dubbed a new form of accountability.<sup>12</sup>

### ***The adoption of a new managerial discourse by police organisations***

Every set of reforms is preceded by the creation of a new discourse which supplants the existing referents. In the case of police services, bureaucratic jargon has been superseded by a private sector rhetoric. Hence, an entrepreneurial terminology has transformed police stations into 'budget units' offering their 'products' and 'services' to 'customers'. Simultaneously, the more traditional concepts of 'citizenship', 'keeping the peace' and 'enforcing the laws' have withered. The main vessels of this new discourse are the annual reports, which abound in strategic visions, corporate goals, mission statements and customer charters designed to sum up in a few vague sentences the complexity of police functions. But in the streets, the new managerial discourse offers very limited improvement to the pressing needs of police 'customers', and particularly those upon which police services are imposed.<sup>13</sup> Police work is by definition complex, fluid and takes place in an often conflictual environment, in which it is nearly impossible to apply narrow concepts of customer satisfaction.

Moreover, this new sanitised discourse can only make the observer sceptical. A commonly identified feature of the police culture has been the tendency of police officers to classify members of the public in different sub-groups defined by subjective and situational attributes such as dangerousness, courtesy, or vulnerability.<sup>14</sup> As a result, the levels of service and

attention vary enormously according to the sub-group to which individuals are assigned. The discourse on the efficiency and best practices of the police negates this reality and replaces it by a construct emphasising neutral and impersonal notions such as the ones of competency or productivity.

On closer examination, it appears that the use of this discourse is mainly circumscribed to the highest levels of the police organisation, especially those in charge of wording reform policies. It is a crucial instrument of horizontal communication with other stakeholders in the criminal justice system, such as the minister's advisers, partner departments or agencies, and parliamentary committees. It frames negotiating processes that seek to determine how police work is controlled by reducing it to managerial jargon and economic statistics. However, at the intermediate and operational levels, the irony and cynicism attached to the use of this discourse clearly demonstrate a refined understanding of its latent significance. Very rarely does it permeate in the media, more interested in crime rates and individual accounts of police corruption and misconduct than in informing a democratic debate on the transformations of policing. Although it does not manifest itself directly in street-level police work, this new bureaucratic discourse has indirect but nonetheless important implications.

### ***Budget reforms and financial accountability***

Traditional methods of public accounting rely on line-budgeting, where levels of spending, once approved, are sustained through the years in line with the inflation or the desired levels of government activity. In this context, budget increases are allocated to various departments and agencies in proportion to their respective size, and the burden of budget cuts, in times of

economic downturn, is likewise shared evenly. But this type of budgeting offers an undue protection to existing activities, particularly because new initiatives can only materialise once 'historical' expenses have been met, without proper consideration for their objective benefit. In order to end the status quo, a new tool, the Program Performance Budgeting System (PPBS), was introduced by the American government in the 1960s and imported in Australia a few years later.

This financial reform sought to rationalise public spending processes by evaluating the costs and benefits of government activities, regrouped in programs and sub-programs. While the previous model focused on the resources and expenses of a given budget unit – the inputs –, program budgeting emphasises particular activities – the outputs – and how respective budget units contribute to their success. Hence, the resources that were previously allocated unconditionally to budget units are now contingent on the types of activities they undertake. A yearly cycle of program formulation and evaluation allows the machinery-of-government to direct funds to specific activities rather than to organisations. This new system undoubtedly favors departments and agencies that comply with priorities determined by the government of the day, while proving of a limited interest in budgetary and efficiency terms.<sup>15</sup>

This very complex model, which requires an enormous amount of extremely detailed information in order to be implemented, was abandoned by many governments in the 1970s but was resuscitated in Australia in a simplified form during the 1980s. Police services were not spared, and by the early 1990s, most of them were reporting their activities through a program budgeting framework.<sup>16</sup> Programs and sub-programs were designed to encompass the main areas of police work, and were budgeted according to perceived needs in the field of law and order. In NSW for example, policing services are distributed in four main programs:

community support, criminal investigation, traffic and judicial support.<sup>17</sup> But while the community support program, which included security for the Olympics, was allocated an extra \$160 million in 2000, following a similar increase of \$152 million the previous year, the traffic program's authorised expenses fell by \$100 million between 1998 and 2000.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, fatal collisions in NSW increased by 4.24 per cent and injury collisions by more than 7 per cent.<sup>19</sup>

This new resource allocation system allows police manager to reorganise the structure of police services according to their new priorities, as demonstrated by the above example, with a flexibility unknown in the previous model. But while it can be argued that budget reforms have the potential to make the police more responsive to the changing needs of Australian society, we are inclined to adopt a more sceptical interpretation. If the avalanche of criticisms aimed at program budgeting by both academics and practitioners over the years has not been able to convince Australian governments to abandon it, shall we conclude that it has survived mainly because it allows a much stricter control of police activity, at the micro and macro levels?

At the individual level, program budgeting requires a detailed knowledge of all activities undertaken daily by police officers in order to assess the amount of time spent on each program and sub-program. Various activity measurement tools are used by Australian police jurisdictions, but the additional amount of paperwork they involve and the failure of police services to analyse the data collected highlight the fact that they are primarily imposed on them by external stakeholders. Statements such as the following proliferate in annual reports, and express clearly this reality: 'This performance report is based on accountability requirements under the *Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985* and *Treasurer's*

*Instruction 904*, and supports the Government's direction in linking resource and performance reporting.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, it has always been one of the prerogatives of the Treasury to steer the budget allocation process, and incidentally, to oversee from a distance the activities of each department and agency. But the advent of program budgeting radically changed the parameters of its intervention. Where it could only threaten budgetary stagnation or reduction, the Treasury has now the capacity to arbitrate which programs will be funded and which ones will be discontinued. Operational decision making mechanisms are therefore partially shifted to the Cabinet, where ministers and advisers can force their priorities upon police commissioners on the basis of financial accountability. Already exposed to a new form of political control disguised as financial accountability, the theoretical independence of the police has been eroded further by the imposition of national performance indicators purporting to measure the efficiency of police activity.

### ***Evaluating police performance and 'productivity'***

In the past, crime rates have been the main indicators of police successes and failures. It was assumed that their trends reflected the levels of police activity and efficiency, even if ultimately, everyone conceded crime was a much more complex phenomenon. Even if it has been proven that crime rates fluctuate without any clear connection to the nature of police activities,<sup>21</sup> the social and political importance of crime statistics must not be discounted.<sup>22</sup> However, crime rates and clearance rates<sup>23</sup> only address one facet of police work, and fail to

take into account the more mundane aspects of policing such as filling forms, escorting prisoners, liaising with the community, etc.

Thus, police bureaucracies and their partner agencies have designed new performance indicators, more complex and supposedly more accurate. The advent of program budgeting and its requirements for a timely quantification of the inputs, outputs and outcomes achieved by each program paved the way for a heightened scrutiny over police organisations. It was in 1993, during the first wave of managerial reforms, that the Prime Minister and the Premiers jointly set up a body whose task was to evaluate the quality of services delivered to the public by the main federal and state departments and agencies.<sup>24</sup> Policing was included in the list of services evaluated, and soon, a series of indicators were produced in order to compare the efficiency, effectiveness and productivity of police organisations across Australia. The purpose of this comparison was to bring an end to the monopoly on information exercised by police services, and to increase their accountability by revealing how they ranked at the national level. This tool is mainly an instrument of control for ministers, who can use it as an alternative and independent source of expertise to the one provided by their police commissioners, further reducing the autonomy of the latter.

In 1999, the police section of the annual report on Commonwealth/State service provision comprised more than a hundred pages of statistics and analytical tables.<sup>25</sup> The evaluative model used contains 26 performance indicators, of which 20 measure effectiveness, and 6 efficiency. Effectiveness indicators deal for example with crime and clearance rates, but also levels of public satisfaction or the fear of crime in public places. Efficiency indicators are concerned with the amount of resources required to solve crimes, attend traffic accidents or the percentage of police personnel walking the beat. If this model appears to be very complex,

it fails to embrace the central proactive dimension of police work, which can account for up to 40 per cent of police activities, according to the conservative estimates of the evaluators.<sup>26</sup>

Another limitation of this model is that the statistics are only made up of recorded incidents, while police work relies heavily on the discretionary power of the constables to resolve situations informally or to negotiate out-of-courts settlements between parties. Measuring the outcomes of such 'hidden' activities will remain impossible, and pretending that these imperfect performance indicators can objectively inform policy-making is preposterous.

Despite all their shortcomings, national performance indicators continue to be used by the Treasury in each state as a coercive tool that spreads its wings well beyond the retrospective financial accountability of the not so distant past. The imperfections of the evaluative apparatus do not hinder the work of the Treasury, as long as it continues to show that savings can be made, in comparison to other police jurisdictions, and that the constant introduction of new managerial reforms remains an imperative. But police organisations are not passive actors in this process, imposed on them by external stakeholders. The main consequence of a mechanism designed to evaluate police work — or any kind of work for that matter — is not that it will entice police services to improve their effectiveness or their efficiency, but that activities which can easily be recorded in a statistical format will become predominant, to the detriment of more pressing problems. The monopoly exercised on the elaboration of performance indicators by the Treasury and other bureaucratic agencies, which rarely submit themselves to similar levels of scrutiny, and the subsequent democratic deficit created by such a restrictive view of police effectiveness is another feature of the new governance of policing in Australia. Another set of reforms where the public has had very few opportunities to make an informed decision has been the growing contractualisation of policing.

## ***Contracts and the privatisation of policing***

The influence of managerialist reforms has not only been felt through new budgeting and evaluative methods, but also by the sub-contracting of numerous police activities to private interests. In the 1990s, the market became gradually a significant provider of non-core police services such as the transfer of prisoners, the transcription of police telephone intercepts, the creation and maintenance of crime databases, or in certain states, the provision of education services for police recruits.<sup>27</sup> More recently, in a policy document written for the minister but leaked to the press, the NSW Police commissioner made it very clear that in the modern policing context, the prevention, detection and investigation of white collar crime was becoming so costly that he could no longer afford to allocate resources to these activities and would consider delegating some of them to private operators.<sup>28</sup> We penetrate here the core of public policing as we know it, and the limit between central and peripheral police activities seems to blur, devolving to the private sector some regalian responsibilities of the state. Brogden and Shearing have highlighted the democratic benefits of this dual or hybrid system in fragmented states, where governments cannot provide security to their citizens anymore.<sup>29</sup> However, we believe less altruistic motives are at work in developed countries. This hijacking of police functions to the private sector is not simply the result of a quest for improved performances, but must be seen as a deliberate effort to impose a new form of privatised and contractualised accountability to certain areas of the police organisation. This form of accountability allows those who word the contracts to include detailed — and sometimes secret — clauses shaping the enforcement of laws without having to yield to public scrutiny. In order to minimise any possible form of resistance from the police hierarchy, governments have also revisited the terms of employment of police commissioners and their executive

teams. Until the early 1980s, most police commissioners were appointed on life tenure. Since then, political authorities have favoured short term contracts (usually three to five years) and have commissioned headhunters to identify potential candidates interstate and overseas. For example, in NSW, following the damning revelations of the Wood Royal Commission in 1997, a former English police officer was appointed as the new police commissioner, with a salary making him the best paid public servant in Australia. Aside from the fact that commissioners who wish to pursue a career in policing will try to avoid at all costs a quarrel with their ministers, governments have also embedded in the formers' contracts of employment very detailed performance clauses. Commissioner Ryan, in NSW, signed in 1999 such an agreement, which covers police service operations, staff management and human resources, business administration and government priority areas.<sup>30</sup> Each responsibility of the commissioner is therefore delineated in objectives and strategies to be implemented, which correspond to priorities determined by the government. In this context, the legal theory of the operational independence of the commissioner cannot be sustained anymore, as we can discern a deliberate strategy from the political authorities to reassert their control over the police.

## ***Conclusion***

In the previous sections, we have examined the profound changes that have affected Australian police organisations over the past twenty years, from the creation of a managerial discourse to the implementation of new budgetary processes, evaluative mechanisms designed to measure their effectiveness and efficiency, and the contractualisation of certain areas of police work. All the managerial reforms described above should not be viewed as a

straightforward bureaucratic reorganisation of Australian police services, in the wake of the royal commissions which exposed systemic corruption in the 1980s and 1990s. They have had critical consequences on the submission of police services to political influences, transforming them into conventional ministerial departments completely responsive to the instructions of their ministers. Police services have become privileged tools of government in the current law and order climate, where political parties outdo each others in the display of punitive and retributive attitudes toward the ‘delinquent classes’.

Globalisation, which has been shown to be one of the major causes for the reform of governments and public services all around the world has also been at the origin of the abandon of many welfare policies. In the dominant neo-liberal ideology, individuals have to assume full responsibility for their social and economic conditions. The adoption by governments that espouse this ideology of punitive social policies for the poor and the underprivileged has accelerated the decline of social cohesion in developed countries. But globalisation also has consuming effects on the middle classes, which are facing increasing levels of social and economic insecurity: life long employment is now a thing of the past, and the costs of education, health services and retirement are passed on to the citizens. In order to reassure the electorate, and because of the impossibility to intervene in the economic sphere, the law and order discourse has become one of the dominant themes of federal and national election campaigns.<sup>31</sup> Hence, social control has displaced welfare as one of the constitutional obligations of the state. New crime legislation is passed,<sup>32</sup> promises for the recruitment of thousands of new police officers are made, and the fight against drugs receives additional resources. In this context, the restored status of law enforcement and social control as a central instrument of government is not compatible with the traditional arrangements, which limit the ability of the minister to control the commissioner and the police service. Confining

the police inside a managerial corset was therefore a logical course of action for governments wishing to exert tight controls over what symbolises the relics of state intervention. In the new governance of policing, police commissioners and their troops might find themselves with more latitude to do the rowing, but the cabinet and the Treasury have definitely reasserted their authority over the steering, without any noticeable benefit for the Australian community.

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Dunsire, 'Modes of governance', in Jan Kooiman, *Modern Governance : New Government - Society Interactions*, Sage, 1993, pp 26-7.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Cope, Frank Leishman and Peter Starie, 'Globalization, new public management and the enabling State', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, vol 10, no 6, 1997, p 449.

<sup>3</sup> Diane Stone, 'Old guard versus new partisans : think tanks in transition', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol 26, no 2, 1991, p 202.

<sup>4</sup> Anthony B L Cheung, 'Understanding public-sector reforms – global trends and diverse agendas', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol 63, no 4, 1997, pp 436-40.

<sup>5</sup> Glyn Davis, 'Toward a hollow state ? Managerialism and its critics', in Mark Considine and Martin Painter (eds), *Managerialism : the Great Debate*, Melbourne University Press, 1997, p 211.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Painter, 'Reshaping the public sector', in Brian Galligan, Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill, *New Developments in Australian Politics*, Macmillan, 1997, p 152.

<sup>7</sup> *The Australian*, 28 July 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Patrick Weller, *Australia's Mandarins : the Frank & the Fearless ?*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p 31 ; Moshe Maor, 'The paradox of managerialism', *Public Administration Review*, vol 59, no 1, 1999, p 6.

<sup>9</sup> Rudolf Plehwe and Roger Wettenhall, 'Policing in Australia : historical and machinery-of-government perspectives', in David Moore and Roger Wettenhall (eds), *Keeping the Peace : Police Accountability and Oversight*, University of Canberra, 1994, p 158.

<sup>10</sup> John Goldring and Patricia Blazey, 'Constitutional and legal mechanisms of police accountability in Australia', in David Moore and Roger Wettenhall (eds), *Keeping the Peace : Police Accountability and Oversight*, University of Canberra, 1994, pp 150-51.

<sup>11</sup> Of course, it is not an isolated phenomenon, and a similar trend has been identified in Great Britain for example. See Frank Leishman, Stephen Cope and Peter Starie, 'Reinventing and restructuring : towards a « new policing order »', in Frank Leishman, Barry Loveday and Stephen Savage, *Core Issues in Policing*, Longman, 1996, pp 9-25.

<sup>12</sup> Janet B L Chan, 'Governing police practice : the limits of the new accountability', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol 50, no 2, 1999, p 252.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew Goldsmith, 'The police we need', *Alternative Law Journal*, vol 24, no 3, 1999, p 129.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, pp 117-21.

<sup>15</sup> David Corbett, *Australian Public Sector Management*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p 100 ; Cedric Pugh, *Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems Working Papers*, Techsearch, Adelaide, 1983, p 17.

<sup>16</sup> Jim Hudzik, 'Financing Australian police forces : issues relating to organisation and work-loads', in Duncan Chappell and Paul Wilson, *Australian Policing : Contemporary Issues*, Butterworths, 1996, p 199 ; Michael Boswell, 'Changing police practices through program management', in Keith Bryett and Colleen Lewis, *Unpeeling Tradition : Contemporary Policing*, Macmillan, 1994, p 38.

<sup>17</sup> NSW Police Service, *Annual Report 1999-2000*, Sydney, 2000, p 35.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 24-25 ; NSW Police Service, *Annual Report 1999-1998*, Sydney, 1999, p 50.

<sup>19</sup> NSW Police Service, *Annual Report 1999-2000*, op. cit., p 12.

<sup>20</sup> WA Police Service, *Annual Report 2000*, Perth, 2000, p 66.

<sup>21</sup> David H Bayley, *Police for the Future*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, passim.

<sup>22</sup> Barry Loveday, 'Managing crime : police use of crime data as an indicator of effectiveness', *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, vol 28, 2000, p 224.

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<sup>23</sup> The percentage of crimes solved by the police.

<sup>24</sup> Bill Scales, 'Performance monitoring : public services in Australia', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, vol 56, no 1, 1997, p 103.

<sup>25</sup> Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision, *Report on Government Services*, vol 1, Ausinfo, Canberra, 1999.

<sup>26</sup> Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision, *Data Envelopment Analysis : a Technique for Measuring the Efficiency of Government Service Delivery*, AGPS, Canberra, 1997, p 104.

<sup>27</sup> Cindy Davids and Linda Hancock, 'Policing, accountability and citizenship in the market state', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, vol 31, no 1, 1998, p 47.

<sup>28</sup> Peter Ryan, *NSW Police Service Future Direction 2001-2005*, NSW Police Service, Sydney, 2000, p 44.

<sup>29</sup> Mike Brogden and Clifford Shearing, *Policing for a New South Africa*, Routledge, London, 1993, p 180.

<sup>30</sup> General Purpose Standing Committee no 3, *Report on Inquiry into Contract of Employment of Commissioner of Police*, Legislative Council, Sydney, 2000, p 56.

<sup>31</sup> David Brown and Russell Hogg, *Rethinking Law and Order*, Pluto Press, Annandale, 1998, p 166.

<sup>32</sup> See for example the *Crime Legislation (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998* passed in NSW on the eve of an election campaign, which criminalised the possession of knives and gave the police extended search powers or the debate on mandatory sentencing in the Northern Territory.